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ABSTRACT 
 
We offer an age-related explanation for the process of resource partitioning. We theorize that, as 
the incumbents within a market category grow older, their ability to undertake structural changes 
diminishes: coupled with evolving audience preferences, this generates a gap between the 
incumbents’ offerings and their audiences’ preferences, creating opportunities for new entrants.	
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Aging is a process that every organization undergoes. Researchers have long striven to 
understand how age affects organizational outcomes. Previous studies suggested that aging plays 
a role in a variety of organizational phenomena, including adaption (Amburgey, Kelly, and 
Barnett, 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1984), strategic positioning (Ruef, 1997; Henderson, 1999), 
and innovation (Sorenson and Stuart, 2000), as well as firm growth and survival (Barron, West, 
and Hannan, 1994; Ranger-Moore, 1997). This literature has taught us that old organizations 
change less frequently and to a lesser extent compared to younger ones (Amburgey et al., 1993, 
Le Mens, Hannan, and Pólos, 2015b); in addition, they tend to be less innovative (Sorenson and 
Stuart, 2000), encounter more difficulties when repositioning (Ruef, 1997), experience lower 
growth rates and, as a result, they are more likely to exit the industry (Barron et al., 1994). The 
wealth of extant studies about the effects of aging on individual organizations contrasts with the 
scant research about its effects on macro-level market structures (for an exception, see Barnett, 
1997), and particularly on the evolution of markets and industries. Yet age is very likely to affect 
these higher-level dynamics because industries consist of individual organizations who, much 
like living beings, inevitably age and experience the implications of this process. 	
This study aims to advance our understanding of the effects of aging on the evolution of 
markets. We provide an age-related explanation for resource partitioning, i.e., the ecological 
mechanism whereby the consolidation of mass or “mainstream” producers results in the 
proliferation of specialists in mature markets (Carroll, 1985; Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000). In 
its classical formulation, the theory holds that concentration rises as a result of scale-driven 
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competition among the large incumbents who occupy the resource-rich center of the market. 
Concentration in the center frees up space in the periphery, where small and specialized 
newcomers fill the pockets of demand that are too small for mass producers relying on scale 
advantages. Hence, the theory predicts greater vitality (i.e., higher likelihood of entry and lower 
likelihood of exit) for peripheral producers as market concentration rises.	
In contrast, we explain the proliferation of new entrants through the effect of aging on 
incumbents. Our theoretical arguments are summarized by the dashed line in Figure 1, where a 
plus sign indicates that the two connected constructs vary in the same direction and a minus sign 
means they move in opposite directions. We theorize that, as a market matures, the average age 
of incumbents grows. One of the effects of aging on incumbents is increasing organizational size 
(Hannan, 1998), which results in greater market concentration—the main predictor in the 
classical theory (Carroll, 1985). However, aging also leads to structural inertia (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Le Mens et al., 2015b), so that the speed at which the incumbents can adapt to 
their environment decreases as they become older. This leads to an increasing mismatch between 
the incumbents’ offerings and the audience members’ (e.g. consumers’) preferences. Such a gap 
creates opportunities for new entrants, whose products are in tune with contemporary tastes: 
therefore, the aging of incumbents encourages new entry. We further conjecture that this effect is 
magnified when the environment changes at a faster rate, i.e. when tastes mutate more quickly. 
We propose three hypotheses about the effects of aging on the likelihood of de novo entry and 
analyze how the entry of new record companies into music genres depends on the incumbents’ 
speed of movement across the product space. Whereas earlier studies have relied on the 
frequency of organizational change to measure structural inertia (e.g., Amburgey et al., 1993; 
Beck, Brüderl, and Woywode, 2008), thus overlooking the role of distance between different 
organizational states, we measure the organizations’ speed of movement taking both frequency 
and distance into account (Le Mens et al., 2015b; Liu, Pólos, and Hannan, 2017).	
 
---------------------------------	
Figure 1 about here	
--------------------------------- 
	
HYPOTHESES	
 
First, we argue that as a market category or segment matures, the mortality of producers who are 
active in the category decreases. Indeed, institutionalization processes are well underway in 
mature markets, where the boundaries are more established, producers become socialized with a 
shared set of norms, and audiences’ expectations converge (Ruef and Patterson, 2009). As their 
mortality decreases, the average age of producers increases. According to Le Mens et al. 
(2015b), older organizations experience greater inertia and have lesser capacity for structural 
change: therefore, we expect their average speed of movement in product space to decline.	
 
 H1: The average speed of movement of incumbents decreases with their age.	
 
 Second, organizational obsolescence sets in if the incumbents cannot keep up with shifts 
in their environment, meaning that they are no longer able to offer what the audience wants. As a 
result, we expect the gap between their offerings and the consumers’ taste to widen (Le Mens et 
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al. 2015b). Such a gap increases the likelihood of entry of new organizations (de novo entrants), 
who are unencumbered by age and internal resistance, and thus are better equipped to cater to the 
unmet demand. Therefore, we expect a greater likelihood of de novo entry in market categories 
or segments that are occupied by older incumbents.	
 
 H2: The likelihood of de novo entry increases as the average speed of movement of 
incumbents decreases.	
 
 Third, we contend the effect of aging on the likelihood of de novo entry is stronger when 
the environment changes more quickly around the incumbents. This is because the gap between 
the incumbents’ offerings and audiences’ preferences grows even larger if audiences’ 
preferences drift at a greater speed. The higher the speed of environmental drift, the more 
difficult it is for the aging and sluggish incumbents to catch up with shifting demand. Because 
this creates even more opportunities for new organizations, we predict that the negative effect of 
incumbents’ speed of movement in product space on the likelihood of de novo entry is amplified 
in fast-changing categories or segments.	
 
 H3: The negative effect of incumbents’ speed of movement on the likelihood of de novo 
entry becomes stronger if the speed of the environmental drift is higher.	
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING: THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 
 
We test our hypotheses on data from the recording industry. In this setting, record companies 
constitute the most relevant organizational units (Lena 2012). In the eyes of market participants, 
record companies belong to one of two groups: majors and independents (or indies). The majors, 
who collectively command about two-thirds of the recording business, abide by corporate norms 
and structures, have access to distribution channels suitable for the mass market. They also have 
access to a considerable amount of resources, which they use to target mainstream tastes. In 
contrast, the indies tend to be more specialized (Benner and Waldfogel, 2016). Although the 
indies are not necessarily young and small, the majors are invariably old and very large: 
historically, they have played a leading role in the consolidation of the music industry (Anand 
and Peterson, 2000).	
 We opted to test our predictions in this market for three important reasons. First, this 
context satisfies the key assumptions required by our theoretical arguments, especially with 
regard to changes in consumer preferences. In music, and in creative industries more generally, 
environmental change is strongly related to fads and fashions (Hirsch 1972) and bandwagon 
effects (Mark, 2003), which create a turbulent environment for artists and record companies to 
cope with (Peterson and Berger, 1971). Second, the recording industry has already been the 
focus of studies dealing with dynamics of concentration and specialization (Dowd, 2004; 
Peterson and Berger, 1996) and has long attracted the attention of resource-partitioning theorists 
(Carroll, 1985, p. 1279). Third, this market satisfies the scope conditions underlying Carroll’s 
(1985) classical formulation of resource partitioning. In fact, the theory requires: (a) non-uniform 
distribution of demand, (b) scale advantages in competition, and (c) limits to scope economies 
(cf. Liu and Wezel, 2015; Reis et al., 2012). In the recording business, customers show a wide 
variety of preferences that, partly because of social influence (Mark, 1998), tend to converge on 
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mainstream tunes (e.g., Peterson and DiMaggio, 1975). This setting thus fulfills condition (a). 
With regard to condition (b), competitive advantages based on economies of scale are apparent 
as the major record companies owe their fortune largely to returns to scale in the production, 
marketing, and distribution of records. Finally, with regard to condition (c), there are limits to 
scope economies because record companies cannot cater to the full spectrum of consumer 
preferences without incurring identity penalties (Phillips and Kim, 2009).	
 
DATA AND VARIABLES	
 
For data collection we primarily draw on Discogs, a user-contributed database and marketplace 
for record collectors. We assume that potential entrants do not screen the market for recorded 
music as a whole, but rather consider a finer segmentation at different levels, thereby targeting 
first music genres and then styles. Our empirical analyses focus on music genres, as resources 
like network and experience tend to be primarily genre-specific. The Discogs database enables us 
to count the number of record companies entering each genre in a given year. We complement 
this with information from the Billboard 200, available to us from November 19th, 1988, to April 
18th, 2015. The Billboard 200 ranks the weekly best-selling albums and EPs in the U.S. based on 
retail sales and, as of 2014, also on digital sales and streaming revenues. We use this chart to 
measure the annual demand for particular genres of music. The final dataset consists of 26844 
companies, 3.8-percent of which are connected to one of the six majors active in 1988–2015, and 
149774 products, which are scattered across 14 genres. Because our unit of analysis is genre-year 
and for each genre we have a 29-year window, our sample consists of 406 observations.	
 The key variable involved in our analysis is organizational speed of movement, which 
captures how fast the record companies active in a particular genre-year move across the product 
space. Building on Le Mens et al. (2015b), we use a Mahalanobis distance to measure 
organizational speed adjusted for the similarity between the genres where the companies in 
question are active. For every record company active in year t, we calculate the Mahalanobis 
distance between its product portfolios at t and t-1. For each genre-year in our sample, we then 
take the mean Mahalanobis distance covered by the incumbents in the focal genre-year and thus 
obtain a variable that increases with the speed at which the incumbents move across the space. 	
 This average speed serves as the dependent variable in our test of H1, but it is rather an 
independent variable in our tests of H2 and H3, where the outcome of interest is the number of 
new entrants in a genre-year. We restrict this count to de novo entrants, i.e., record companies 
that are entirely new to the market (cf. Carroll et al., 1996), thereby excluding lateral entries from 
other genres. For each genre-year in our sample, we count the record companies that released at 
least one product in the focal genre during the focal year and for which the focal year is the first 
year of activity. Because a firm can release more than one product during its first year of activity, 
and because each product can belong to more than one genre, some firms are counted as new 
entrants in multiple genres during the same year.	
Testing H1 also requires us to measure the mean age of incumbents in a given genre-year. 
To this purpose, we associate every record company with an internal clock that starts from zero 
at the firm's year of entry and increases with each passing year. For each genre-year in our 
sample, we compute the mean age of active record companies. In addition, we compute the mean 
number of records released by the incumbents during the focal year, regardless of genre, as a 
proxy for their size. To test H3, we need to measure the environmental drift within each genre, 
i.e., the pace at which audiences’ preferences change. Such a variable is challenging to compute 
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directly because it requires in-depth information about the products' features and how these 
features are distributed among successful products. Our data source does not grant this 
information because it only lists the products' genre memberships: however, we can assume the 
pace at which consumers update their preferences within a genre to be slower if the genre is 
older. With this in mind, we use genre age as a proxy for the volatility of consumers' tastes, that 
is, the local speed of environmental drift. We equate the year of “birth” of any given genre with 
the release year of the earliest record assigned to that genre on Discogs.	
Because H2 and H3 are intended to support our proposition that organizational speed 
contributes to dynamics of resource partitioning, it is important to show that music genres, as 
sub-markets of the recording industry, conform to the predictions of resource-partitioning theory. 
We thus need to show that increasing market concentration in the hands of mainstream producers 
(the majors) increases the number of de novo entrants (Carroll, 1985). In organizational ecology, 
it is common to account for concentration through a C4 ratio (e.g., Carroll and Swaminathan, 
2000). We compute the number of records released by each incumbent in the genre-year that sold 
enough copies to appear on the Billboard 200 during the same year and divide it by the total 
number of records from that genre-year that appeared on the chart. This quantifies the market 
share of individual record companies. We aggregate the shares of the top four record companies 
in each genre-year in order to measure concentration in a way that is agnostic to whether these 
companies are independent or owned by a major. 	
We include control variables for various genre characteristics that are likely to affect both 
the speed of organizations and the likelihood of de novo entry. Two such variables are category 
contrast (Carnabuci et al., 2015) and leniency (Pontikes and Barnett, 2015). In addition to these 
two properties, we also compute the yearly demand for products in a given genre by counting the 
records released in that genre-year that appeared on the Billboard 200 during the same year and 
dividing by the total number of records from that year that appeared on the chart during the same 
year (regardless of genre). Finally, we control for the density of incumbents. Compatibly with 
ecological research (Carroll and Hannan, 1989; Hannan and Freeman, 1988), we use a quadratic 
polynomial to account for both legitimating and competitive effects. All the independent 
variables are lagged by one year to address concerns of simultaneity.	
 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION	
 
To estimate effects on organizational speed (H1), we use a generalized linear model (GLM) 
assuming a gamma distribution of responses (Myers et al., 2002, pp. 214–215). To account for 
systematic differences between the genres, we specify genre-fixed effects through a set of 13 
dummy variables. In addition, we split our study period into four time-windows and use three 
dummies to account for period-fixed effects. These windows correspond to spells within our 
study period where different sets of major record companies were active. Time-period dummies 
serve the purpose of controlling for changes in the number of mainstream producers in the 
market as well as other industry shocks (Bhattacharjee et al., 2007). To estimate effects on the 
likelihood of de novo entry (H2 and H3) we use a negative binomial model. Again, all predictors 
are lagged by one year and we include fixed effects for genres and periods. 
In addition to confirming the existence of resource-partitioning dynamics (Carroll, 1985) 
in the market for recorded music, the results of our analysis (available upon request) return three 
findings of interest: First, the incumbents’ average speed of change decreases with age, and 
therefore we found support for H1. This effect is moderated by size, i.e. larger firms are the ones 
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whose speed decreases most as a result of aging. Second, the incumbents’ average speed of 
change has a negative effect on the likelihood of de novo entry, meaning that new firms are more 
likely to enter market categories or segments (in our setting, genres) where the incumbents are 
slow. Therefore, H2 also receives support. Third, the age of a category or segment crucially 
moderates the relationship between incumbents’ speed and de novo entry, so that if the 
incumbents are slow and the segment is young, new entrants are even more likely but if the 
incumbents are slow and the genre is old, they are less likely. This suggests that newcomers 
maximally benefit from the incumbents’ inertia in unstable environments, where audience 
members’ preferences change too fast for aging organizations. Based on this evidence, H3 looks 
also supported. If the environment is stable, however, the effect of aging on new entry turns 
negative, which suggests that slow organization remain capable of meeting demand.	
Our study makes multiple contributions to the literatures on age dependence and resource 
partitioning. First, while existing studies on age dependence almost exclusively focus on the 
effect of aging on individual organizations, we explore how aging drives changes in market 
structure. Given the fundamental role of aging in any organization, poor understanding of the 
macro-level effects of age impedes our ability to explain and predict market evolution. Second, 
our study advances the current understanding of resource partitioning by proposing an alternative 
explanation based on aging and inertia. This explanation adds to recent theoretical developments, 
which extend the classical model by incorporating effects of organizational identity (Liu and 
Wezel, 2015). Finally, our study makes empirical contributions to both literatures: our novel 
measure of firms’ speed not only takes the frequency of change into account, as is common in 
existing studies, but also accounts for distance between the various positions that firms may 
occupy in the product space. 	
 
REFERENCES AVAILABLE FROM THE AUTHOR(S)	
 
 
Figure 1: Classical (solid) and age-related (dashed) explanations for resource partitioning	
 
	
